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Healthcare Law
by Kathryn S. Dunnam*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article serves as a review of significant healthcare developments
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit over the
last two years and builds upon Mercer Law Review's last Healthcare
Article' in Volume 65. Specifically, this Article will cover cases dealing
with physician speech, the False Claims Act, 2 and the Medicare
3
Secondary Payer Act.
II. LIMITATIONS ON PHYSICIAN SPEECH

Wollschlaeger v. Governor4 arose from a challenge of Florida's Firearm
Owners' Privacy Act (FOPA)5 enacted in 2011.6 The plaintiffs' claims,
grounded in the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, 7 challenged
the constitutionality of FOPA as some portions regulated the content of
physician speech.8 Practically, FOPA restricted medical professionals on
what they could ask patients regarding firearm ownership.9
Doctors and medical organizations filed suit in the United States
District Court of the Southern District of Florida against Florida
officials. 10 The district court permanently enjoined the law's provisions
*Associate Attorney in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C. Mercer University (B.A., 2013);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014-2016);
Administrative Editor (2015-2016). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
1. Terri K. Benton, Healthcare, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 65 MERCER L. REV. 1027
(2014).
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2018).
4. 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
5. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338 (2018) (subsections (1), (2), and (6) held unconstitutional
by Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1319).
6. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1300.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1300.

9. Id.
10. Id.
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regarding "record-keeping, inquiry, anti- discrimination, and antiharassment" because those provisions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment" and First Amendment. 12 The Florida officials
subsequently appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit issued three different
opinions upholding FOPA.13 In June 2016, the court voted to rehear the
case en banc. 14 Applying heightened scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit
ultimately held that FOPA's record-keeping, inquiry, and antiharassment provisions violated the First Amendment but that the antidiscrimination provision may stand. 15
The court first characterized FOPA's record-keeping, inquiry, and
anti-harassment provisions as speaker-focused and content-based
restrictions on speech because "[t]hey apply only to the speech of doctors
and medical professionals, and only on the topic of firearm ownership."16
As such, it rejected rational basis review and applied heightened
scrutiny. 17The standard, as established by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,18
requires a showing by state officials that the provisions "directly
advance[] a substantial governmental interest and that the measure[s]
[are] drawn to achieve that interest. There must be a 'fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."'"9 The
court, therefore, looked to the empirical evidence relied upon by the
legislature, which amounted to six anecdotes. 20
The court explained that doctors typically ask patients about health
and safety risks such as household chemicals, swimming pools, and
firearms. 21 Per the opinion, the American Medical Association promotes
physician inquiry about household firearms so that patients may be
educated as to their dangers, especially regarding children. 22 The six
anecdotes suggested that medical providers began asking Florida
patients "unwelcome questions or made purportedly improper comments
regarding their ownership of firearms." 23 The court noted that a National
Rifle Association representative even recounted a scenario where a
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1300-01.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1311.
564 U.S. 552 (2011).
Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572).
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
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medical provider refused to examine a child if the parent did not answer
questions regarding household firearms. 24 Thus, FOPA was enacted. 25
The purported interests that state officials sought to protect through
FOPA included: protecting "the Second Amendment right of Floridians
to own and bear firearms" from private encumbrances, 26 protection of
patient privacy, 27 "ensuring access to health care without discrimination
or harassment," 28 and "the need to regulate the medical profession in
order to protect the public." 29 The State further argued that "the First
Amendment is not implicated because any effect on speech is merely
incidental to the regulation of professional conduct." 30 However, the court
held that the state's interests did not meet Sorrell's heightened scrutiny
test.3 1 It analogized the facts at hand to Conant v. Walters,32 a United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case that "struck down ...
a federal policy which threatened doctors with revocation of their DEA
prescription authority if they recommended the medicinal use of
marijuana to their patients." 33 There, the Ninth Circuit categorized the
speech as content and viewpoint based and invalidated it on First
Amendment grounds. 34 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit struck down all the
challenged provisions except for the anti-discrimination section. 35
In Wollschlaeger, the court gave deference to physicians and medical
providers as an authority. There is value given to what information they
believe necessary for treatment. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
"[i]n 'the fields of medicine and public health . .. information can save

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1312.
27. Id. at 1314.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1316.
30. Id. at 1308. The State supported this argument by relying upon a concurrence
written by United States Supreme Court Justice White in 1985. Id. The Eleventh Circuit
summarized Justice White's analysis: "when a person is exercising judgment with respect
to a particular client, he is 'engaging in the practice of a profession' and his speech is
'incidental to the conduct of the profession,' such that his First Amendment interests are
diminished." Id. (quoting Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment)). The Eleventh Circuit, however, distinguished Lowe and its progeny. Id. at
1309. It explained that 'The Supreme Court has never adopted or applied Justice White's
rational basis standard to regulations which limit the speech of professionals to clients
based on content." Id. at 1310.
31. Id. at 1311.
32. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
33. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1310.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1318.
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lives."'3 6 The court held that restricting physician speech is an

inappropriate methodology to change the way household firearms are
discussed in the medical context.37 With that being said, FOPA's antidiscrimination provision still stands, and any discrimination against a
patient based solely on the ownership of a firearm will not be tolerated. 38
III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: "CONTRADICTION IS NOT A SIGN OF FALSITY,
NOR THE LACK OF CONTRADICTION THE SIGN OF TRUTH.""

In United States v. AseraCare, Inc.,40 the United States brought an
action under the False Claims Act (FCA)41 against AseraCare, Inc.
(AseraCare), 42 alleging that AseraCare submitted false claims to
Medicare on behalf of 123 hospice patients claiming that the patients'
medical records did not support the medical prognosis. 43 The FCA
provides, in relevant part, that if a person:
36. Id. at 1313 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566). While the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that information can save lives, Florida is not unique in its attempt to limit
the medical community's access to patient health risk information in terms of gun
ownership. By the enactment of the Dickey Amendment in 1996 (which has been
reauthorized each year since), the United States Congress prevents the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) from using its funding "to advocate or promote gun control."
Department of Health and Human Services Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-242-44 (1996). Many medical organizations have opposed the
amendment in recent years because of its stifling effect on research. Letter from the
Academic Consortium for Integrative Medicine & Health, et al., to the U.S. Senate and U.S.
House of Representative's Appropriations Committees (Apr. 6, 2016), http://files.www.
drsforamerica.org/blog/blogs-from-dc-climate-change-and-health-at-the-white-house/CDC
letter_4-6_FINAL.pdf. In 2016, the American Medical Association, along with over one
hundred other organizations like the American Psychological Association, American
Association for the Advancement of Science, Doctors for America, the American College of
Preventative Medicine, and the American Academy of Pediatrics, wrote to the U.S. Senate
and U.S. House of Representatives "urg[ing]" them to provide the CDC with funding to
research gun violence because of the health risks guns present. Id.
37. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1313-14.
38. Id. at 1317 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(5) (2018)).
39. Blaise Pascal, quoted in GEORGE ENGLEBRETSEN, BARE FACTs AND NAKED TRUTHS:
A NEW CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH 153 (2006).

40. 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2016), argued, No. 16-13004 (11th Cir. Mar.
16, 2017).
41. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (2018).
42. The United States also brought an action against Golden Gate National Senior
Care, LLC, an entity providing billing services for AseraCare, among others. Complaint in
Intervention at ¶ 10, United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282 (N.D. Ala.
2016) (No. 2:12-CV-0245-KOB).
43. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1283. The Federal Regulation governing hospice
Medicare eligibility requires certification of the person's illness. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (2018).
"The certification must specify that the individual's prognosis is for a life expectancy of 6
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(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval; [or] (B) knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a
false or fraudulent claim ... is liable to the United States Government
for [civil penalties]. 44
In 2015, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama bifurcated the trial into phases one and two, with the "falsity
element" to be tried in phase one.4 5 The court subsequently granted
AseraCare's motion for new trial because the court did not instruct the
jury that a difference of opinion is not enough to prove falsity. 46 The court
also put the parties on notice that it would consider summary judgment
sua sponte in light of its concern over whether or not the United States
"[had] sufficient admissible evidence of more than just a difference of
opinion to show that the claims at issue are objectively false as a matter
of law." 47 The court explained that the United States had "to point to
objective evidence in the Phase One record that the court may have
overlooked that shows a particular claim was false, other than [the
expert's] testimony." 4 8
In 2016, the court granted, sua sponte, summary judgment in favor of
AseraCare. 49 The court noted that the litigation in AseraCare, Inc. "has
always been about whether AseraCare knowingly submitted false claims
to Medicare by certifying patients as eligible for hospice who did not have
a prognosis of 'a life expectancy of 6 months or less if the terminal illness
runs its normal course."'50 It is well established in the Eleventh Circuit
that "the submission of a false claim is the sine qua non of a False Claims
Act violation." 5 1 The United States must provide "proof of an objective
falsehood" in prosecuting a claim. 52 When a healthcare entity uses

months or less if the terminal illness runs its normal course." 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(1)
(2018).
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2). The FCA provides that "knowing" and "knowingly" "(A)
mean that a person, with respect to information-(i) has actual knowledge of the
information; (ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii)
acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information; and (B) require no proof
of specific intent to defraud." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2018).
45. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1377 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
46. Id. at 1382-85.
47. Id. at 1385.
48. Id. at 1387.
49. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1286.
50. Id. at 1283 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(1)) (emphasis in original).
51. Id. (quoting Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1052 (11th Cir. 2015)).
52. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr. Inc., 787 F.
Supp. 2d 1329, 1339 (M.D. Ga. 2011)).

1214

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

improper practices, those practices alone "are insufficient to show falsity
without proof that specific claims were, in fact, false when submitted to
Medicare."53
In its ruling on the "falsity" requirement, the court disagreed with the
United States' argument that the lack of "clinical information" in the
patients' medical records supporting their hospice eligibility warranted
the claims for those patients as "false." 54 The court explained that
"[wihen hospice certifying physicians and medical experts look at the
very same medical records and disagree about whether the medical
records support hospice eligibility, the opinion of one medical expert
alone cannot prove falsity without further evidence of an objective
falsehood."5 5 The court cautioned that if
[A]ll the Government needed to prove falsity in a hospice provider case
was one medical expert who reviewed the medical records and
disagreed with the certifying physician, hospice providers would be
subject to potential FCA liability any time the Government could find
a medical expert who disagreed with the certifying physician's clinical
judgment. The [C]ourt refuses to go down that road.56
The court held that the United States failed to prove falsity as a matter
of law and granted summary judgment for AseraCare.5 7
The United States subsequently appealed, and oral arguments took
place on March 16, 2017.58 The court has not yet issued an opinion. The
ruling on this matter will significantly impact the prosecution of false
claims moving forward. As the 2015 Memorandum Opinion stated in the
underlying litigation: "One of the undecided areas of law in the Eleventh
Circuit is the legal standard for falsity in a case like this one, where the
Government alleges that the hospice provider's medical records do not
support its hospice eligibility certifications, and, therefore, the
certifications are false."5 9 If the Eleventh Circuit agrees with the
Northern District of Alabama, the United States will not be able to
merely rely upon expert testimony to provide "proof of an objective

53. Id. at 1283-84 (quoting Urquilla-Diaz,780 F.3d at 1045).
54. Id. at 1283.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1285.
57. Id. at 1286. In its 2015 Memorandum Opinion, the court suggested that the
outcome may be different if the United States "offered [] evidence that AseraCare billed for
phantom patients, that it submitted Certificates of Terminal Illness with forged signatures,
or that any AseraCare employees lied to or withheld critical information from the certifying
doctors about any specific patients." AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1375.
58. AseraCare, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1283.
59. AseraCare, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1375.
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falsehood" in these hospice cases. According to one healthcare expert, this
would constitute "a stunning development in the often clinically murky
area of complex medical practice, with major implications for health care
fraud enforcement."6 0
IV. MEDICARE ADVANTAGE ORGANIZATIONs' ACCESS TO

DOUBLE DAMAGES
The Eleventh Circuit recently held in Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v.
Western Heritage Insurance Co.61 that, as a matter of first impression, a
private cause of action is available to Medicare Advantage Organizations
(MAOs)62 under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSP).63 MAOs are
now officially entitled to bring claims against a tortfeasor's liability
insurer when seeking reimbursement for secondary payments. 64 This is
significant because the private cause of action allows for double
damages. 65

A. The UnderlyingLitigation
The litigation began in 2009 when a Humana Medicare Advantage
Plan enrollee and her husband brought an action against Hamptons
West Condominiums for personal injuries. In 2010, while the parties
negotiated settlement, Humana issued an "Organization Determination"
to the plaintiffs for $19,155.41.66 Meaning, Humana made a claim to that
payment.6 7 In terms of background, "Humana operates as an MAO,
providing Medicare Part C coverage (also known as a Medicare
Advantage [P]lan) to Medicare-eligible enrollees and receiving in return
a per capita fee from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS)."68 Humana sought to be reimbursed for said amount because the
MSP provides that "Medicare payments are secondary and reimbursable
60. Zack Buck, Keeping an Eye on the Eleventh, HARv. L. BLOG: BILL OF HEALTH
(June 29, 2017), http:/Iblogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2017/06/29/keeping-an-eye-on-theeleventhl#more-22892.
61. 832 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2016).
62. Id. at 1231-40.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2018).
64. HumanaMed. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1239-40.
65. Id. at 1240; 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A) (2018).
66. HumanaMed. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1232.
67. An "Organization Determination" is a term of art meaning the Medicare Advantage
Organization's "original claim for payment." See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES, PAYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION CONTRACTOR (PDRC) PROCESS MANUAL 5
(2010), https://www.cms.gov[Medicare[Health-Plans/HealthPlansGenInfo/Downloads/PD
RCProcessManual-.pdf.
68. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1231-32.
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if any other insurer-even a tortfeasor's liability insurer-is liable."69
Despite the option for the plaintiffs to appeal Humana's Organization
Determination, no administrative appeal was taken.7 0
The parties in the underlying personal injury action settled for
$115,000, releasing Hamptons West Condominiums and its insurer,
Western. Notably, the plaintiffs did not mention a Medicare lien, any
other liens, or any rights to subrogation in the settlement agreement. By
signing the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs also agreed to indemnify
the defendant and Western against said liens or rights to subrogation.7 1

B. Humana's Attempts to ObtainReimbursement
Humana then sought to recover the $19,155.41 by filing an action
against the original plaintiffs, and procedural havoc ensued, resulting in
the original plaintiffs bringing a declaratory action in state court to
determine the amount owed to Humana. After Humana appealed the
state court decision, a Florida District Court of Appeal held that Florida
courts did not have jurisdiction over the matter on the basis that once the
administrative process under the Medicare Act is exhausted, the act
requires federal judicial review. 72
Humana subsequently brought an action in federal court against
seeking
defendant's liability insurer,
Western,
the original
reimbursement for Humana's secondary payment. Humana alleged that
it was entitled to the following: (1) double damages under the MSP's
private cause of action; (2) declaratory relief under Medicare's statutory
and regulatory schemes; and (3) damages under state law theories such
as unjust enrichment. Upon motion, the district court dismissed the
state-law claims. In 2014, when Humana moved for summary judgment,
the district court found that the private cause of action under the MSP is
available to a Medicare Advantage Organization and entered a judgment,
leading to Western's appeal. 73

69.
(2010)).
70.
71.
72.
2015)).
73.

Id. at 1232 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2) (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(a)(4)
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Reale, 180 So. 3d 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Id. at 1233.
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C. The Eleventh CircuitAnalysis
In its discussion, the Eleventh Circuit covered the background of the
MSP, the Medicare Advantage Program, 74 and analyzed an MAO's rights
under the MSP. 75

1.
The MSP
The MSP, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2), makes Medicare the
"secondary payer" to certain primary plans.76 Congress passed this
legislation "in an effort to shift costs from Medicare to the appropriate
private sources of payment."7 7 The MSP prevents the Medicare trust fund
from becoming depleted by requiring that primary plans-for instance,
other forms of health insurance-pay claims before Medicare does so. 7 8
While the Secretary of Health and Human Services can make a payment
through Medicare to a beneficiary before a primary plan, that payment
is "conditioned on the reimbursement" of the Medicare trust fund.79
Notably, as the court pointed out, the MSP "does not mention MAOs and
refers almost exclusively to the Secretary, the United States, and the
Medicare trust fund."8 0 The MSP also contains a provision regarding a
private cause of action that allows for the recovery of payment from
primary plans who fail to reimburse for primary payment.8 1 This
provision allows for double damages. 82 In the past, the Eleventh Circuit
has held "that the MSP private cause of action is available 'against a
primary plan that pays a judgment or settlement to a Medicare
beneficiary, but fails to pay Medicare its share."' 83 However, until the

74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21-1395ww-28 (2018). This program is also known as Medicare
"Part C." 832 F.3d at 1235.
75. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1233-36.

76. Id. at 1234.
77. Medicare Secondary Payer, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.cms.gov[Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Coordination-of-Be
nefits-and-Recovery-OverviewlMedicare-Secondary-Payer/Medicare-Secondary-Payer.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
78. Id.
79. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1234 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i)
(2018)).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), which states "[tihere is established a private
cause of action for damages (which shall be in an amount double the amount otherwise
provided) in the case of a primary plan which fails to provide for primary payment (or
appropriate reimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2)(A).").
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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case at hand, the Eleventh Circuit had not directly addressed if the
MSP's private cause of action is available to an MAO.84

The Medicare Advantage Program
2.
The court next explained that Congress enacted the Medicare
Advantage Program in 1997 to "harness the power of private sector
competition to stimulate experimentation and innovation that would
ultimately create a more efficient and less expensive Medicare system."85
Practically, the private sector's power is "harnessed" by allowing private
insurance companies to administer Medicare benefits per an agreement
with CMS.86 Although MAOs are actually private companies, they

function like the government and "provide[] at least the same benefits as
an enrollee would receive under traditional Medicare."8 7 Section
1395w-22(a)(4) 88 of the Medicare Advantage Program, or the MAO
right-to-charge provision, allows MAOs as a secondary payer to recover
against a primary plan. 89 Notably, the Medicare Advantage Program and
right-to-charge provision are separate from the provisions in the MSP, as
explained above.
3.
MAO Rights Under the MSP
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately agreed with Humana's argument
that, as an MAO, it can avail itself of the MSP's private cause of action
and sue a primary plan.90 In forming this opinion, the court relied upon
its own statutory interpretation of the MSP, 91 the MAO right-to-charge
provision, 92 CMS regulations, 93 and Third Circuit precedent.9 4 The court
rejected Western's argument that MAOs are governed by the MAO
right-to-charge provision and do not gain secondary payer status from
the MSP.96 To the contrary, the court held that the MSP applies to MAOs,
stating "[w]e see no basis to exclude MAOs from a broadly worded
84. Id. at 1235.
85. Id. (quoting In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d
353, 363 (3d Cir. 2012)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(a)(4) (2018).
89. HumanaMed. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1235-36.
90. Id. at 1236.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(b)(2)(A), 1395y(b)(3)(A).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(a)(4).
93. 42 C.F.R. § 422.108(f) (2018); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.24(e), (g) (2018).
94. HumanaMed. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1236-38 (relying on In re Avandia, 685 F.3d
at 360).
95. Id. at 1237.

HEALTHCARE

2018]

1219

provision that enables a plaintiff to vindicate harm caused by a primary
plan's failure to meet its MSP primary payment or reimbursement
obligations."9 6 The court explained that the MAO right-to-charge
provision's parenthetical reference to the MSP suggests that MAO
secondary payments are made "pursuant to the MSP, [and] not the MAO
right-to-charge provision."97 The court further noted that some "aspects
of the Medicare Act indicate an MAO must make a secondary payment
any time the Secretary would do so." 98 Thus, the court concluded that
Congress intended MAOs to function as secondary payers in the same
manner as the Secretary.9 9 The court affirmed the district court's order
granting Humana's motion for summary judgment, awarding double
damages.100

4.
Judge Pryor's Dissent
Judge Pryor grounded his dissent in statutory interpretation. He
argued that Humana failed to state a claim because the private cause of
action in Paragraph (3) of the MSP must be construed in accordance with
Paragraphs (1) and (2).101 As noted above, those provisions do not
mention MAOs.102 Judge Pryor emphasized that § 1395w-22(a)(4), or the
right-to-charge provision, states that an MAO "may" seek reimbursement
from the liability insurer and only references Paragraph (2) insofar as
MAOs are secondary to primary plans. 103 According to Judge Pryor, this
provision:
[D]oes not subject [1AOs] to all of the parts of section 1395y(b)(2).
Instead it establishes a different regulatory regime-one that does not
require [MAOs] to be secondary payers, impose time limits on
reimbursement, require demonstrated responsibility, establish an
extensive administrative process, give the Secretary a cause of action,
or subrogate the United States to any right to payment by a primary
plan. A [MAO] charges primary plans in accordance with section
1395w-22(a)(4), not section 1395y(b)(2)(A). 104

96. Id. at 1238.
97. Id. at 1237.
98. Id. at 1238.

99. Id.
Id. at 1240 (majority opinion).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. (Pryor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1234 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1242 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Judge Pryor then corrected the majority in that an MAO is not
required to make a secondary payment, but "remains free to be the
primary payer."10 5 He further critiqued the majority on determining that
Humana's arguments "appeared" to comply with CMS regulations
without explaining how they do so.106 Judge Pryor concluded that
"[b]ecause a Medicare Advantage Organization is not the Secretary and
its treasury is not the Trust Funds, [he] respectfully dissent[s]." 07
Judge Tjoflat's Caution
5.
Notably, on December 31, 2017, a majority of the active judges on the
Eleventh Circuit voted against rehearing this matter en banc and filed
the order on January 25, 2018.108 Circuit Judge Tjoflat authored an
impassioned dissent, building upon Judge Pryor's dissent in the original
opinion issued by the Eleventh Circuit. 109 Judge Tjoflat expressed
concern over the holding for a number of different reasons. He argued, as
the majority acknowledged 1 o and Judge Pryor emphasized,111 that the
MSP's language is silent as to MAOs, and does not explicitly extend them
the private right of action. 112 This is further exemplified by the fact that
while the debt collection process for the government in this regard is
"cumbersome,"11 3 MAOs are not subject to the same procedure. 114 He
further explained that the Medicare Advantage Program protects the
"common law reimbursement right[s] for private insurers acting as
MAOs."llS

This common law principle is grounded in state law-

Alabama, Florida, and Georgia "[a]ll ... recognize the rights of medical
insurers to seek reimbursement under both contract law and under the
doctrine of equitable subrogation." 16 Judge Tjoflat argued that on this
7
basis, there is no need to allow additional recovery under the MSP.11

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1243.
108. Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage Ins.
Co., No. 15-11436, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018), http://media.call.uscourts.gov/
opinions/pub/files/201511436.ord.pdf.
109. Id. at *3-39 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
110. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 832 F.3d at 1234.
111. Id. at 1240.

112. HumanaMed. Plan, Inc., No. 15-11436, at *16-17; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(b)(2)(A)also 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).

(B); see
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Humana Med. Plan, Inc., No. 15-11436, at *22.
Id. at *20, *22.
Id. at *26.
Id. at *24-25 n.8.
Id. at *29.
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Indeed, he concluded, "this Court's opinion amounts to a rewriting of
state insurance laws." 18 Judge Tjoflat then outlined the two models he
believed the Eleventh Circuit created as a result of its decision:
So now we have two models. Under one model, the § 1395w-22(a)(4)
model, an MAO can recover its outlay by standing in the shoes of its
insured and suing a liability insurer as part of its insured's tort action.
If it follows this model, the MAO is subject to a number of rules
designed to ensure justice is done in the case, including the rule
barring recovery by the MAO unless and until the insured has been
made whole and the requirement that the court apportion the
insured's recovery as the equities dictate. This model has worked for
many years and in many contexts; indeed, MAOs use this model all
the time to recover their outlays when they make secondary payments
to insureds who don't have Medicare Advantage.
Under the other model, the model created by the Court's interpretation
of the private right of action, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A), an MAO can
recover its outlay from the liability insurer directly. It may do so not
on the basis of rights derivative of the insured, but by its own rights
and at its own option. And it may do so notwithstanding the
tortfeasor's denial of liability and regardless of whether the insurer
has already paid the MAO's outlays to the insured. And there are no
equitable restrictions on this new model: the MAO need not submit to
court apportionment. Moreover, double recovery by the MAO's insured
is just fine. On top of all that, if the liability insurer balks for any
reason, the MAO may recover double its outlays. 119
Thus, Judge Tjoflat argued that the matter should have been subjected
to rehearing en banc.1 20
As explained above, the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Humana
Medical Plan, Inc. leaves MAOs with expanded reimbursement rights.
Moving forward, as Judge Tjoflat cautioned, liability insurers and their
attorneys will need to spend additional time and effort during discovery
uncovering whether any of the claimant's expenses have been paid by an
MAO in order to avoid the potential payment of double damages. 121
V. CONCLUSION
From 2016 through the present, the Eleventh Circuit produced many
noteworthy decisions with strong implications moving forward. In

118. Id.
119. Id. at *37.
120. Id. at *39.

121. Id. at *35.
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Wollschlaeger v. Governor, the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida's
efforts to regulate professional conduct created unconstitutional
restrictions on physician speech. 122 With the pending outcome of United
States v. AseraCare Inc., the Eleventh Circuit will shape how "falsity" is
determined under the FCA and will permanently change the prosecution
of hospice claims in the future. Finally, in Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v.
Western Heritage Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit provided private
insurance companies expanded reimbursement rights under the MSP,
essentially allowing them the same rights of recovery as the United
States government with less procedural safeguards.

122.

848 F.3d at 1319.

